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The General Desirability of Water Transfers

The Nature of Agricultural
Agricultural Water Transfers

Flexibility in the allocative pattern of any
scarce resource is highly desirable from the point
of view of economic efficiency. The resource can
move from lower valued uses to emerging higher
valued uses that result from demographic,
economic, and public value changes. Naturally it
is desirable that this flexibility be accompanied by
security of tenure for those holding the resource so
that longer term investments will not be
endangered. These two attributes make water
markets attractive as vehicles for effecting water
transfers (Howe, et al, 1986).
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The economists’ models of efficient
competitive markets, if applied to water resources,
would picture a smooth, relatively low-cost
process of moving water from the lowest-value
applications in agriculture to growing nonagricultural uses. Naturally, no one expects the
process to work perfectly since water markets
suffer from lack of information, heterogeneity of
water itself (by location, seniority, quality, etc.),
and possibly high transactions costs.
Some models of the transfer process,
especially those of the linear-programming
variety, overlook some of the realities of water as
a tradable resource and thus may produce some
misleading predictions (e.g. Mann, Sparling, and
Young, 1987; Howe and Ahrens, 1988).

The increasing economic and environmental
costs of new water supplies reinforce the
increasing popularity of water transfers (e.g.
Frederick, 1986; Howe and Easter, 1971). The
largest pool of water available for transfer is found
in irrigated agriculture where about 80% of
consumptive use in the western United States
takes place (U.S.G.S., 1988).

A study currently underway in Colorado
(U.S.G.S. grant through the Colorado Water
Resources Research Institute to the Natural
Resources Law Center, University of Colorado,
1987) has investigated 743 completed transfers for
which application was made in the decade 197684. These transfers exhibited the following
characteristic:

The agricultural sector is currently under
increasing pressure from international competition
and increasing domestic resistance to farm price
support programs. The outlook is for a continued
fall in real prices for major agricultural
commodities on world markets (Young, et al,
1988). Thus one would expect reallocations from
agriculture to emerging non-agricultural uses,
especially urban and industrial uses, provide the
institutional framework permits such transfers.

agric. to agric.:

146

agric. to non-ag.:

531

non-ag. to non-ag.

66

1 cu. ft./sec. or less:

3301

greater than 1 cfs.:

216

100 acre-feet or less:

148

greater than 100 af:
48
1
Under the Colorado system of water administration, water
rights and their transfers are often characterized by a flow rate
only. Storage rights and some flow rights are volumetrically
quantified.
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Thus what we observe is a large number of
small water transfers accompanied by a few
more eye-catching large transfers, dominated
by agricultural to non-agricultural uses. Many
of these are irrigation to stock-watering and
rural domestic uses or transfers to small rural
subdivisions. The public’s awareness of
transfers is limited to the large ones such as
the transfer of 40,000 acre-feet of Colorado
Canal Water (Arkansas River Valley) to the
City of Colorado Springs or the still-to-be
effected transfer of 52% of the Rocky Ford
Ditch (9,300 a.f.) to the City of Aurora.

transfer some water, why not a large volume
that will reduce the unit costs of physical
transfer.
The issue of transaction costs is not so
simple. These costs include search costs for a
buyer or seller; application costs to the court or
state
engineer;
costs
of
hydrologic,
engineering, and agronomic studies; court
costs; and costs of countering or meeting
objections to the transfer. At first glance, it
would appear that these costs also would
exhibit substantial economies of scale, i.e. that
some of them would be fixed or at best would
increase less than in proportion to the size of
the transfer.. Preliminary analysis of Colorado
data indicates that, while this is true for some
of the minor cost items, the costs occasioned
by opposition to the transfer increase rapidly
as the size of transfer increases (Boggs,
unpublished). Every sizeable transfer has
opponents, sometimes dozens. Large water
rights owners (cities and ditch companies)
frequently retain counsel to oppose every
proposed transfer as a matter of course. Thus,
there appear to be (at least under the Colorado
system) substantial diseconomies of scale in
transaction costs.

While the small water transfers appear to
conform to the economists’ model of a
smoothly operating water market, the large
transfers certainly do not: they involve large
volumes of water from a single location; they
typically involve very senior (reliable) water
rights; and they frequently represent water that
has been applied to the better soils, growing at
least some valuable crops. What is wrong with
the model?
The need for urban areas and industry to
obtain reliable water every few years is not
attractive to urban users. These senior rights
were (by definition) developed early and
typically applied to the best bottom lands as
regional development progressed. Naturally,
the fact that these rights are transferred out of
agriculture doesn’t necessarily imply that the
crops they irrigated will stop being produced.
It is likely (and evidence to date indicates) that
high-valued crops that are market-limited in
quantity, will be picked up by other farmers in
the area. The crops that are forfeited are
generally forage crops, small grains, and
irrigated pasture.

Impacts of Water Transfers
If all water transfers were economically
efficient from, say, a state accounting stance,
then state income would increase as a result of
the transfer--at least in a present value sense.
Can we expect transfers to be efficient? There
are several reasons to expect at least some
transfers to be inefficient from state or national
accounting stances. First, certain important
public values are not protected by
administrative criteria in the approval process.
Especially water quality, instream values, fish
and wildlife, and other recreational values are
variously omitted from state criteria. Of
course, there could be net increases in these
values as well as decreases, but frequently no
protection is provided, so these values are
likely to be ignored by the transferors of water.

The large volume of water involved in
these big transfers at first glance appears to be
explainable by economies of scale, both in
physical transfer systems and in transaction
costs. Some transfers require the construction
of pipelines, tunnels, or canals--structures that
exhibit great economies of scale in
construction costs. If a city proposes to
17

local economy and on family farming. The
“public trust doctrine” that has been invoked in
California in the Mono Lake case serves to
protect an undefined set of public values-probably not a desirable policy development
because of the uncertainty of the criteria being
used.

Secondly, cities frequently accumulate water
supplies far in excess of current needs, either in
anticipation of future growth or to have “super
safe” systems. While some of this excess water
may be leased back to the agricultural sector until
it is needed, a higher level of risk is introduced
for the user, precluding higher valued uses. Since
urban water costs are frequently hidden from
urban water users (because of inappropriate
pricing), urban managers adopt an excessively
risk-averse attitude, making the accumulation of
raw water supplies excessively large.

Governance structures for irrigation and
conservancy districts that are more representative
of the populations affected by water systems
would help in the introduction of broader social
values in water management. Many irrigation or
conservancy districts today incorporate towns
and industries, yet continue to be governed by
“old water boy” groups that have too little
appreciation of the changing values of water to
society. These districts often have excellent
technical management and do what they do very
well; it’s just that they are doing, in part, the
wrong things.

Even if water transfers are economically
efficient from state or national points of view,
there is no guarantee--indeed little likelihood-that the area or basin of origin will gain from the
transfer. Most transfers are out of the basin of
origin, so the benefits to the new user do not
accrue to the basin of origin. Since many of the
basins of origin are depressed or declining
regions to begin with, the likelihood that the
proceeds from the sale of water will be reinvested
in that basin is small. Thus the phasing-out of
agriculture will be accompanied by various
negative local multiplier effects (forward or
backward linkages) that are unlikely to be offset
by new activities. Finally, the environmental
effects on the basin of origin are almost always
negative.

Included among the issues is the need to
make district boundaries and allowable water
uses flexible. Districts typically distribute project
water within specified boundaries that had
significance historically but that grow out of
date. Failure to allow water to be sold outside
historical boundaries can introduce substantial
inefficiencies in water allocation. An example is
found in the contrasting water prices found in the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District-about $1,000 per acre-foot in perpetuity--and
prices for comparable non-project water in the
northern Denver suburban area--up to $4,500 per
acre-foot. While the Northern District’s
management feels an obligation to keep
Colorado-Big Thompson project water in the
District, the farmers who still own most of the
water see their water wealth diminished by a
factor of 3 or 4, while Denver suburbs pay
unnecessarily high prices for water or are backed
into supporting unneeded new projects like the
Two Forks Dam.

Institutional Reforms Needed to Maximize Net
Benefits from Transfers
It should be clear from the discussion above
that unfettered free market transfers are unlikely
to be economically efficient. What is needed is
the protection of or accounting for public values
that are not taken into account by buyers and
sellers nor, in some states, incorporated in the
water law. Since appropriations doctrine
everywhere protects other water diverters, what is
needed is an expansion of state water laws to
recognize and protect the wider set of instream,
recreational, and aesthetic values. The states of
Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, and New Mexico have
incorporated in their water law such criteria as
non-degradation of water quality, protection of
fish and wildlife, and even (Idaho) impacts on the

Other small federal and state policy
changes could greatly facilitate socially
responsible water transfers. Federal projects,
originally authorized
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by Congress for certain water uses only,
should be freed up to serve any beneficial
purposes able to buy the water and to repay
federal cost obligations. States could
streamline the administrative or court
processes by which transfers are reviewed and
approved (or modified) by using standard
guidelines (e.g. for computing historical
consumptive uses), by keeping better water
rights and transfer records (today only a
specialist lawyer or engineer dare venture a
guess about the real nature of a water right),
and by providing information on stream flows
and storage that will help bring buyers and
sellers together.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WATER MARKETING AND
WATER TRANSFERS
Lawrence J. MacDonnell*
Most of the West’s renewable water
resources are already appropriated and
developed. Opportunities for additional
development are limited by a number of
factors. At the same time, demands for water
in the West are undergoing major and lasting
changes. Irrigated agriculture, long the
dominant user of water in the West, is
declining in relative economic importance.
New consumptive demands now derive
largely from urban growth. There is also a
growing demand for “instream” uses of water.
These conditions suggest the need for
reallocation of a portion of developed water
supplies to these new, higher value demands.

Rights to use western water resources
exist in a variety of forms. Appropriative
water rights may provide either direct flows of
water or storage rights. In many cases, rights
to use ditch water or water in a reservoir are
based on ownership shares. Water may be
supplied for use on the basis of a contract.
Rights to use water may derive from land
ownership as, for example, with groundwater
in some states. Reallocation occurs when any
existing use or right to use is changed or
transferred to a new use. The term “water
marketing” applies to the lease or sale of any
such right. Widespread attention in recent
years has been focused on water marketing as
a

Western Water Rights
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